UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-22-2015

State v. Karsten Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42154

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Karsten Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42154" (2015). Not Reported. 1936.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1936

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,

0

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
SAMANTHA JO KARSTEN aka,
SAMANTHA JO SISTRUNK,
Defendant-Appellant.

______________

OPY

)
)

No. 42154

)
)
)

Twin Falls Co. Case No.
CR-2008-6923

)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................5
Karsten Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion ........ 5
A.

Introduction .................................................................................5

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................................6

C.

Karsten's Appeal Is Moot ...........................................................7

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse It's Discretion
When It Denied Karsten's Motion To Set Aside Her
Guilty Plea .................................................................................. 9

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427,
546 P.2d 382 (1976) .................................................................................. 7
Cenarrusa v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 395, 509 P.2d 1316 (1973) .............................. 7
Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 811 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 6
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity By and
Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. By and
Through Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1996) ......................... 7
Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) ............................... 8
State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 325 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2014) ......................... 5, 11
Statev. Funk, 123 Idaho 967,855 P.2d 52 (1993) ............................................. 11
State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 319 P.3d 1191 (2014) ..................................... 5, 11
State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521,300 P. 3d 53 (2013) ............................. 2, 5, 9, 11
State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 942 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1997) ............................. 9
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ....................................... 6
State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168,280 P.3d 195 (Ct. App. 2012) ........................... 7, 8
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 272 P .3d 382 (2012) ................................. 7
State v. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292 (2001) ................................... 6
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) ................................ 9
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999) .......................................... 6
State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 337 P.3d 647 (2014) ........................................... 6
State v. Shock, 133 Idaho 753, 992 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................. 6
State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 824 P.2d 120 (1992) .................................... 6

ii

STATUTES
I. C. § 19-2604 ............................................................................................. passim

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Karsten appeals from the district court's order reducing her felony
conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(3). On appeal,
Karsten argues the district court erred when it did not set aside her guilty plea
and dismiss her judgment of conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ).

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Karsten drove Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Schmitz to the hotel room of Mr.
Weir, so they could collect a debt from Mr. Weir. (R., pp. 26-31.) She parked
three blocks away and waited for them to return. (Id.) In Mr. Weir's hotel room,
Mr. Ferguson pulled a gun and demanded Mr. Weir repay the debt. (Id.) Mr.
Ferguson repeatedly punched Mr. Weir and threatened Mr. Weir with a knife and
a set of homemade brass knuckles. (Id.) Mr. Ferguson instructed Mr. Schmitz to
rip the phones out of the wall and take everything of value as a collateral. (Id.)
They took Mr. Weir's cell phone and wallet.

(Id.)

Later, during police

questioning, Karsten admitted that she knew she was driving Mr. Ferguson and
Mr. Schmitz to collect a debt from Mr. Weir.

(Id.) The state charged Karsten

with Aiding and Abetting Robbery. (R., pp. 48-50.)
Karsten pied guilty to an amended charge of Aiding and Abetting
Aggravated Assault. (R., pp. 54-64, 67-69.) In October 2008, the district court
entered judgment and sentenced Karsten to five years with three years fixed.
(R., pp. 79-82.) The district court suspended the sentence and placed Karsten
on probation for three years. (Id.) In November 2011, the deputy clerk reported
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that Karsten had failed to pay the ordered fines and restitution. (R., p. 90.) The
district court then entered an amended judgment, but did not make any findings
that Karsten violated her probation. (R., pp. 91-95.)
In February 2014, Karsten filed a Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea and
Enter Dismissal Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. (R., pp. 98-100.) The state agreed
that Karsten turned her life around and did not have any probation violations.
(Tr., p. 3, Ls. 17-23.)

However, the state argued that because Karsten's

probation had expired, the district court could only grant relief under Idaho Code
§ 19-2604(3) and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p. 3, L.
17 - p. 4, L. 5.)

The district court agreed and held it could not set aside

Karsten's conviction under I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), but could reduce Karsten's
conviction to a misdemeanor under I.C. § 19-2604(3). (Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L.
23.) The district court determined it was bound by the Idaho Supreme Court's
interpretation of subsection (1) which only allowed relief if the motion was made
while the defendant was still on probation. (Id. (citing State v. Guess, 154 Idaho
521, 300 P. 3d 53 (2013).)
THE COURT: Okay. Here's the problem. I have ruled on this issue.
I hope I am wrong with my ruling. I'll say that to you. I said that
when I made the ruling. I'll say it again and again and again. This is
the most ludicrous statute that I've ever seen, but here's the
problem. Earlier this last year the Idaho Supreme Court decided
State versus Guess, and in a lengthy footnote Justice Eismann
pointed out that the language of 19-2604 (1) seems to say on its
face that when the legislature used the language "the Court may, if
convinced by a showing made there is no longer cause for
continuing the period of probation," that you have to make that
motion before probation expires. Makes no sense to me
whatsoever. Logically judicially, fairness, but that's the way -- that's
what that Court said. It was dicta. I admit it's dicta. The supreme
court has never ruled on it. I have issued two opinions from this
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Court saying that if that's what the statute says, it's not my
prerogative to amend it. I invited people to appeal. I invite you to
appeal this case because I think the ruling I'm about to make
makes no sense. But sometimes that's the way it goes.
My interpretation is that probation has expired in this case;
therefore, subsection (1) doesn't apply, subsection (3) does. State
stipulated to a misdemeanor, I'll certainly grant that relief, but I can't
grant the other relief. And again, please take this up. Can I say it
any more forcefully? Because I think we need get an interpretation
of the statute. It may very well be that there is a case, I think the
public defender's office sometimes listens to me, sometime they
don't.
(Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 23.) The district court entered a written order, which
stated, in part:
Should the opinion of the court be overturned by subsequent
appellate court decision or action of the Idaho Legislature, the
defendant shall be allowed to motion the court for relief other than
reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor without being prejudiced
by the fact that the court granted partial relief through this order.
(R., pp. 108-109.) Karsten timely appealed. (R., pp. 107-113.) After Karsten
filed her appeal, Idaho Code § 19-2604 was amended effective July 1, 2014,
pursuant to S.L. 2014 ch. 283 §1.
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ISSUE
Karsten states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to set aside
Ms. Karsten's guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Karsten failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
applied Idaho Code § 19-2604 in accord with Idaho Supreme Court precedent?
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ARGUMENT

Karsten Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Karsten argues that the following language of the previous

version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) is ambiguous: "if convinced by the showing
made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it
be compatible with the public interest. .. "

(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

Karsten

argues the comma followed by the word "and" create two separate clauses that
are applicable under two different circumstances.

(Id.)

The first clause is

applicable when a defendant is on probation and the second is available to the
defendant after probation has expired. (Id.)
Karsten's appeal is moot because the legislature amended Idaho Code
§19-2604(1) and the district court ruled that if the legislature amended § 192604(1) it would entertain a second motion under Idaho Code § 19-2604. (R.,
pp. 108-109.) Karsten has potential relief available to her in the district court
under the amended statute and this appeal will have no practical effect on the
outcome.
If the merits of Karsten's claim are reached, her interpretation is contrary
to repeated and binding Idaho precedent interpreting Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ).
See Guess, 154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56; State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332,
335, 325 P.3d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 25, 319
P.3d 1191, 1194 (2014).

The Idaho appellate courts do not read the comma

followed by an "and" to create two separate clauses.
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kl

Instead, the Idaho

Appellate Courts repeatedly interpreted the previous version of Idaho Code § 192604(1) to create four requirements that must be present for a defendant to be
permitted to withdraw his or her guilty plea.

kl

Karsten's interpretation is

contrary to established Idaho law and should be rejected.

B.

Standard Of Review
It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant relief under

Idaho Code§ 19-2604. See State v. Shock, 133 Idaho 753, 992 P.2d 202 (Ct.
App. 1999) (citing State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189,191,824 P.2d 120, 122
(1992); Housley v. State. 119 Idaho 885, 887, 811 P.2d 495, 497 (Ct. App.
1991 )). "When a trial court's discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed
on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id.
(citing Statev. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
The question of statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the
appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, _, 337
P.3d 647, 651 (2014) (citing State v. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 349-350, 17
P.3d 292, 293-294 (2001 )).

"Where the language of a statute is plain and

unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction."
459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)).
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kl (citing

State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho

Karsten's Appeal Is Moot

C.

Karsten's appeal is moot because after the district court entered it's order
the legislature amended the very language in Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) under
which the district court denied relief. The appellate courts can dismiss an appeal
when the case involves only a moot question. State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168,
170, 280 P.3d 195, 197 (Ct. App. 2012).

"A case is moot if it presents no

justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect
upon the outcome." ]lt (quoting State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272
P.3d 382, 391 (2012)). "Actions which challenge the validity or the manner of
implementation of a statute or regulation are often mooted because the provision
has been repealed, amended or revised." Idaho Schools for Equal Educational
Opportunity By and Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. By and Through
Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282, 912 P.2d 644, 650 (1996); see also Briggs v.
Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 434, n. 5, 546 P.2d 382, 389, n.
5 (1976); Cenarrusa v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 395, 396, 509 P.2d 1316, 1317
(1973).
Any decision on appeal will have no practical effect on the outcome of this
case because the district court ruled that if Idaho Code § 19-2604 were
amended the district court would entertain a second motion from Karsten for
relief. (R., pp. 108-109.)
Should the opinion of the court be overturned by subsequent
appellate court decision or action of the Idaho Legislature, the
defendant shall be allowed to motion the court for relief other than
reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor without being prejudiced
by the fact that the court granted partial relief through this order.
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(ld.)(emphasis added.) The district court entered the order on March 11, 2014.
(R., p. 107.)

Idaho Code§ 19-2604 was amended effective July 1, 2014,

pursuant to S.L. 2014 ch. 283 §1.

Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) now states, in

relevant part:
the court, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer
cause for continuing the period of probation should the defendant
be on probation at the time of the application, and that there is
good cause for granting the requested relief, may terminate the
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the
defendant. ..
Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) (2014).

Therefore, regardless of the ruling of this

appellate court, Karsten is able to re-petition the district court for relief under the
amended Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ).

As a result, an appellate judicial

determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome of this case.
This appeal is therefore moot and none of the exceptions to the mootness
doctrine apply. There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences
imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged
conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of
repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns
of substantial public interest.
Long, 153 Idaho at 170, 280 P.3d at 197 (citing Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho
158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008)). There is no possibility of collateral legal
consequences imposed on Karsten because she can re-petition the district court.
The challenge to the statute is not capable of repetition because the statute has
been amended.

Finally there are no concerns of a substantial public interest

because the statute has been amended and future challenges to Idaho Code §
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19-2604 will be brought under the new version and not the old. There is no
exception to the mootness doctrine and this court should dismiss this appeal and
Karsten can seek her remedy in the district court.

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse It's Discretion When It Denied Karsten's
Motion To Set Aside Her Guilty Plea
Karsten argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled

that it did not have the discretion under the previous version of Idaho Code§ 192604(1) to set aside her guilty plea because her probation had expired.
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 1 Karsten's interpretation of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) is
contrary to binding Idaho precedent.
The version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) in effect when the district court
ruled stated:
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence
has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon
satisfactory showing that:
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit,
in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated
any of the terms or conditions of probation; or
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and
graduated from an authorized drug court program or mental health
court program and during any period of probation that may have
On appeal, Karsten does not challenge the analysis contained footnote three of
Guess, which determined that the "continuing probation" language required the
I.C. § 19-2604(1) motion be made before the period of probation has expired.
(See Guess, 154 Idaho at 527, n.3, 300 P. 3d at 59, n.3.)) Since she did not
raise the interpretation of this clause in her brief it should not be considered on
appeal. See State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 448, n.1, 942 P.2d 568, 572, n. 1
(Ct. App. 1997) (Idaho Court of Appeal will not consider issue not raised in
appellant's brief); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601
(1993) (Idaho Supreme Court will not consider an issue not raised in appellant's
brief).
1
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been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and
the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding
that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of
probation;
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be
compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant or may amend the
judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the
number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This
shall apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted
and granted probation by the court before this law goes into effect,
as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final dismissal of the
case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the
defendant to his civil rights.
I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(2013)(emphasis added).
Karsten

argues

that

the

underlined

language

"sets

forth

two

circumstances under which relief is available because the use of a comma
before the word 'and' indicates that the two clauses function independently of
each other. The first clause applies if the movant is currently on probation. The
second clause applies if the movant's probation has expired." (Appellant's brief,
p. 9.)

Karsten's interpretation is contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent

interpreting this statute.
The Idaho Supreme Court explained that this statute creates four
requirements that much be present in order for a defendant to be permitted to
withdraw his or her guilty plea.
In order for a defendant to be permitted to withdraw his or her guilty
plea: (a) the defendant must have at all times complied with the
terms and conditions of probation; (b) the court must be convinced,
by the showing made, that there is no longer cause for continuing
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the period of probation; (c) the court must find that such relief is
compatible with the public interest; and (d) the court, in its
discretion, must decide to grant such relief. Complying with the
terms and conditions of probation is only one of the four
requirements for obtaining relief under the statute
Guess, 154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56. The Idaho appellate courts have
reiterated this four part requirement. See Allen, 156 Idaho at 335, 325 P.3d at
676; Glenn, 156 Idaho at 25, 319 P.3d at 1194. Karsten's interpretation of this
version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) would create only three requirements.
Under Karsten's interpretation, a movant would be subject to requirements (a)
and (d) but only one of either (b) or (c).
interpreting Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ).

Karsten's brief ignores the cases

Karsten's interpretation is contrary to

repeated and binding precedent.
The district court did not err when it held it was bound by the terms of this
statute.

(Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 23.).

"A court does not have the inherent

power to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea and have the
charge dismissed upon successful completion of probation." Guess, 154 Idaho
at 523-524, 300 P. 3d at 55-56 (citing State v. Funk, 123 Idaho 967, 969, 855
P.2d 52, 54 (1993)). "The power of a court to permit a defendant to withdraw his
or her guilty plea and have the charge dismissed is controlled by Idaho Code
section 19-2604(1 )."

JsL

154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56. The district court

interpreted the applicable version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) and applied
precedent. The district court did not err.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court dismiss this appeal as moot or
in the alternative affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of January, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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